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Abstract
This paper analyzes the choice of commodity tax base when countries
set their taxes non-cooperatively in a two-country symmetric reciprocal
dumping model of intra-industry trade with free entry and trade costs.
We show that the consumption base (destination principle) dominates the
production base (origin principle) when trade costs are high or demand is
linear. For lower levels of trade costs and nonlinear demand, the welfare
ranking of the two tax bases is ambiguous. Hence, there is no clear preference
for a tax principle with an ongoing movement towards closer economic
integration.
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1 Introduction
This paper uses a model of imperfect competition to investigate the choice
between commodity tax principles as integration progresses. The innovation
of this paper is that the number of active firms is not fixed but determined
endogenously. A fixed market structure may be a reasonable assumption in
the short run, but in the long run firms will enter if they see opportunities
for positive profits as a result of changes in tax policy. Conversely, incumbent
firms will exit if their profits decline and become negative. In this setting, we
demonstrate that consumption taxes dominate production taxes if trade costs
are high or if demand is linear. The welfare ranking for nonlinear demand
is ambiguous. This is in contrast to the existing literature on commodity
taxation under imperfect competition which seems to agree by and large
that production taxes are favorable for low trade costs. Hence, our paper
demonstrates that there is no clear policy recommendation even if trade
becomes less and less costlier.
The choice of commodity tax base has become an important policy is-
sue with the ongoing movement towards closer economic integration. Under
the destination principle traded commodities are taxed in the country of
consumption, while under the origin principle they are taxed in the coun-
try of production. The majority of international trade in the past has been
taxed under the destination principle, which is largely true of trade today.
Implementation of tax policy under the destination regime requires border
tax adjustments, making administration more costly and difficult as inte-
gration proceeds. This is because as economies become more integrated, it
becomes easier to engage in cross-border shopping in neighboring countries.
Furthermore, the advent of internet shopping and other forms of mail-order
purchase have led to increased opportunities for consumers to purchase goods
from abroad. This increased cross-border movement of goods leads to high
compliance costs and difficulty in enforcement of border tax adjustments un-
der the destination regime. Taxation under the origin principle has no such
problems. Goods are taxed in the country of production and so there is no
need for any border tax adjustments. It is therefore clear that, from an ad-
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ministration cost perspective, the origin principle is favorable as barriers to
trade are reduced.
Beyond the administration cost perspective, a number of recent papers
have looked at the choice of commodity tax base, when countries set their
taxes non-cooperatively, under perfect competition and using several differ-
ent models of imperfect competition.1 For example, Keen and Lahiri (1998)
find in a duopoly model with integrated markets, a homogeneous good and
no transport costs that taxation under the origin principle leads to a first-
best outcome when taxes are set non-cooperatively and the firms and coun-
tries are symmetric. Haufler et al. (2005) focus on the role of trade costs in
a two-country symmetric reciprocal dumping model of international trade
in identical commodities. They find that for high trade costs the destina-
tion principle dominates, while for low trade costs the origin principle dom-
inates. Thus they support the use of the origin principle in more integrated
economies. Hashimzade et al. (2005) use a model of Bertrand competition
with product differentiation and find that with nonlinear demand the origin
principle dominates the destination principle if integration is sufficient (i.e.,
for sufficiently low levels of trade costs) and tax revenue is not valued. They
also replicate the results of Haufler et al. (2005) and find that the results with
Cournot competition are robust to some degree of product differentiation.
The results of all these papers depend on the assumption that government
policy interventions have no effect on the decisions made by firms on entry
and exit. Only Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2004) investigate the welfare implications
of the two tax principles in a model with free entry. They employ a model of
monopolistic competition with transport costs and international mobility of
capital and firms, and they find that in a symmetric two-country model tax
competition under the destination principle will lead to a first best outcome.
However, tax competition in their model under the origin principle leads to
a tax rate that deviates from the Pareto efficient level.
1Under perfect competition, the destination principle is favorable because it warrants
production efficiency when countries employ different tax rates (see Mintz and Tulkins,
1986, and Kanbur and Keen, 1993) unless terms of trade effects become dominant (Lock-
wood, 1993). For a detailed survey of cooperative and non-cooperative commodity taxa-
tion, see Lockwood (2001).
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Models of monopolistic competition ignore any strategic interactions and
are thus hard to compare with Cournot models. Since we would like to demon-
strate that the extension to endogenous market structures is not innocious,
the model we consider is a modification of the one used by Haufler et al.
(2005) to allow for free entry and exit of firms. It is based on Brander and
Krugman’s (1983) reciprocal dumping model of intra-industry trade.2 Our
extension introduces a zero profit condition which eliminates any rent shift-
ing motives when setting taxes under either tax regime. There are, however,
other distortions as too many firms are active each of which produces too
little in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and looks
at the simple case of a closed economy in order to isolate the motives to use
taxes to correct for inefficient entry and suboptimal consumption. Section 3
analyzes the optimal non-cooperative tax rates under the destination princi-
ple and origin principle. Section 4 derives the optimal coordinated tax rate in
order to provide a benchmark against which to compare the outcomes under
the two tax regimes and looks at the role of trade costs in the choice of com-
modity tax base. Section 5 concludes the paper. Since many mathematical
derivations and proofs are tedious, we have relegated most of them to the
Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two identical countries labelled by subscripts i = 1, 2. Each country
has an imperfectly competitive industry producing a tradeable good under
increasing returns to scale. A four-stage game is considered. In the first stage,
the countries agree on a tax principle, and in the second stage they set their
tax rates non-cooperatively. The idea behind this setting is that although
countries may be able to reach agreement on the tax principle they may find
it harder to commit to a tax rate. In the third stage, given the tax rates, the
2Our model is similar to the model investigated by Venables (1985). However, this
model deals with trade policy instruments like tariffs and production subsidies whereas
commodity taxation is not allowed to discriminate against foreign firms.
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firms decide whether to enter. In the final stage, firms engage in quantity
competition in a Cournot fashion. The innovation of this paper is the third
– allowing the number of firms to be determined endogenously.
For country i we denote the quantity sold of this good by Qi. Letting
utility in each country i be denoted by Ui = U(Qi) (which is assumed to
be three times differentiable) and denoting the inverse demand function by
pi = p(Qi), we have p(Qi) = U
′(Qi), p′(Qi) = U ′′(Qi) < 0.
Firms within each country are assumed to be identical. With ni firms
in country i, we denote a single representative firm’s sales to the domestic
market by yi and its exports by xi.
3 (In case of symmetry, we will write
y = y1 = y2 and x = x1 = x2.) Since the quantity sold must be equal to the
quantity produced we have the following market-clearing conditions:
Q1 = n1y1 + n2x2, Q2 = n1x1 + n2y2.
Each firm faces a fixed cost f and a constant marginal cost of c. This assump-
tion means that average cost declines with the number of sales and we have
increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, each unit exported carries a trade
cost s, which is to encompass all barriers to trade except the production and
consumption taxes we are considering.
In order to isolate the effects of inefficient entry and suboptimal con-
sumption we first consider the case of a closed economy. In this case the
destination and origin principles are equivalent, and the optimal tax rate is
set to correct for the inefficiently high number of firms each with an output
that is too low.4 Dropping the subscripts, profits of a representative firm in
autarky are given by Π = (p− c− t)y−f , leading to the first order condition
for profit maximization
Πy = (p− c− t) + p′y = 0. (1)
3The number of firms must, in reality, be an integer, but we follow the literature on
endogenous markets structures and ignore this restriction here. If the number of firms is
not too small, the integer constraint is not important (see Mankiw and Whinston, 1986,
n 12).
4We consider only specific taxes in this paper. Note that specific and ad valorem taxes
are not equivalent under imperfect competition (see Delipalla and Keen, 1992).
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With free entry and exit profits are driven to zero, i.e.,
Π = (p− c− t)y − f = 0. (2)
Without exports, Q = ny, and the system is completetly determined as we
have three equations with three unknowns (Q, y, n). The government will set
the tax t so as to maximize social welfare which is the sum of consumer
surplus and tax revenue, i.e.,
W = U(Q)− p(Q)Q+ tQ = U(Q)− cQ− nf,
where the last transformation follows from the zero profit condition (2). The
effect on welfare of a change in the tax rate is then given by
dW
dt
= (p− c)dQ
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
− f dn
dt︸︷︷︸
(II)
. (3)
Term (I) is the consumption wedge effect, and term (II) is the market struc-
ture effect, which represents the rise in aggregate fixed costs associated with
entry of new firms. Using the first order condition for welfare maximization
(see Appendix A.1) we solve for the optimal tax rate:
t∗ =
1
dQ/dt
[
p′Q
dQ
dt
−Q
]
= −np
′′y2
2
. (4)
The second order condition for profit maximization allows us to sign most of
the equilibrium changes in firm output, sales and number of firms which are
summarized by Table 1.
Table 1: Tax effects under autarky
dy/dt dQ/dt dn/dt
p′′ < 0 + − −
p′′ = 0 0 − −
p′′ > 0 − − +/−
With concave inverse demand a small rise in the tax leads to a rise in the
output per firm, a fall in the number of firms in equilibrium, and a fall in
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overall sales. The optimal tax rate in this case is positive, since the welfare-
improving drop in the number of firms outweighs the negative consumption
wedge effect. On the other hand, when inverse demand is convex, there is a
fall in the output of each firm as a result of a tax increase while there is an
ambiguous effect on the number of firms. Thus a subsidy will be optimal as
it induces each of the firms to produce more output in equilibrium, with the
corresponding efficiency gains outweighing any negative effects on industry
fixed costs and the direct cost in subsidy payments. Finally, in the special
case of linear inverse demand, the consumption wedge effect and the market
structure effect exactly offset each other and so the optimal tax rate is zero.
From the preceding simplified model it is clear that the signs of the opti-
mal tax rates under the destination and origin principles will depend critically
on the curvature of the inverse demand function.
3 Commodity taxation and trade
In this section, we consider the effects of commodity taxation on output
levels. Under the destination principle, the country i tax rate applies to all
sales in country i. Profits for representative firms in both countries under the
destination regime, denoted by the superscript D, are given by
Π1D = (p1 − c− t1)y1 + (p2 − c− s− t2)x1 − f,
Π2D = (p2 − c− t2)y2 + (p1 − c− s− t1)x2 − f,
respectively, where ti denotes the consumption tax imposed by country i.
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Appendix A.2 has the details for firm behavior in this environment. As
before, we measure country i’s welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and
tax revenue which is returned to the consumer as a lump sum:
WDi = U(Qi)− pi(Qi)Qi + tiQi.
5We assume that demand is log-concave: ∀z ∈]0, Z¯] : p′i(z) + p′′i (z)z < 0, where Z¯
is defined as the aggregate output for which the price equals zero. Since marginal costs
are constant, log-concave demand implies Πiyixj ≡ p′i(z) + p′′i (z)yi < 0,∀yi ∈]0, z], and
Πxiyj ≡ p′j(z) + p′′j (z)xi < 0,∀xi ∈]0, z], and thus imposes strategic substitutability in the
sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), so that the reaction functions of firms
slope down. Furthermore, it guarantees that the second-order conditions are satisfied and
that the equilibrium is stable in the sense of Hahn (1962).
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Country i seeks to maximize is national welfare with respect to its own tax
rate. To ensure the second-order conditions for a national welfare maximum
hold we assume that W is continuous and quasi-concave in ti for all tax
regimes. In our symmetric setting all the tax rates in country 2 will be iden-
tical to those of country 1. So, for brevity, the results will be derived only for
country 1.
The nationally optimal destination principle tax rate for country 1 (see
Appendix A.2) is given by
t̂D1 =
1
∂Q1/∂t1
(
p′1
∂Q1
∂t1
Q1 −Q1
)
(5)
=
1
∂Q1/∂t1
p′1
(
∂n1
∂t1
y1 + n1
∂y1
∂t1
+
∂n2
∂t1
x2 + n2
∂x2
∂t1
)
Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I),−
− Q1︸︷︷︸
(II),+
 .
From expression (5), we observe two effects, the efficiency effect (I) and the
tax revenue effect (II). The efficiency effect (I) represents the incentive to
subsidize consumption in order to increase the domestic under-consumption
of the traded good. This effect is made up of four terms. The signs of these
terms determine the absolute size of the efficiency effect. The first two terms
reflect, respectively, the incentives to decrease the inefficiently high number
of domestic firms each of which incurs a fixed cost of setup, and to increase
the production of each of the firms in order to take advantage of economies of
scale. The last two terms represent the incentive to decrease imports in order
to reduce wasteful transport costs, while recognizing their pro-competitive
effects. The tax revenue effect (II) is simply the incentive to use taxation to
gather revenue.
The comparative statics results summarized in Table 2 show how a change
in the destination regime tax rate in country 1 (with the tax rate in country
2 held constant) affects the firms’ production levels, quantities demanded,
and the number of firms in equilibrium. For concave inverse demand, a small
increase in the tax has the effect in both countries of increasing each firm’s
production for domestic sale, and decreasing total sales and the number of
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Table 2: Consumption tax effects
∂yD1
dt1
∂xD1
dt1
∂yD2
dt1
∂xD2
dt1
∂QD1
∂t1
∂QD2
∂t1
∂nD1
∂t1
∂nD2
∂t1
p′′ < 0 + + + +/− − − − −
p′′ = 0 0 0 0 0 − 0 0 +
p′′ > 0 − − − +/− − + +/− +
firms active in equilibrium. When trade costs are high, each firm in country 2
increases their production for export and their share of the market in country
1 rises. On the other hand, when trade costs are low, the converse takes place.
In the case of convex inverse demand a small rise in the tax rate in coun-
try 1 will decrease the total output of each country 1 firm and in particular
decrease output for domestic consumption and increase the average cost of
domestic production. In general, when inverse demand is convex, a tax rise
will have an ambiguous effect on the number of firms in country 1. For suffi-
ciently low or high trade costs the tax will decrease the number of domestic
firms in equilibrium and lower total industry fixed costs. Furthermore, the
tax will encourage entry in country 2 while having a generally indeterminate
effect on each country 2 firm’s output for export. When trade costs are high,
the tax will increase each of the country 2 firm’s output for export and in-
deed total exports. This is because the tax rise decreases the initially large
domestic market share of country 1 firms leading to a large rise in perceived
marginal revenue of country 2 firms enabling them to bear the high trade
costs and increase export production. When trade costs are low, country 2
firms have a high share of the market in country 1 and so the rise in the tax
will have only a small effect on their perceived marginal revenue that will be
outweighed by the increased marginal cost of exporting.
The nationally optimal destination principle tax rate is
t̂D = −np
′′(y + x)(y2Πyy + yx(Πyx +Πxy) + x2Πxx)
2(yΠyy + x(Πyx +Πxy))
, (6)
where we have dropped the superscripts (since the equilibrium is symmetric).
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The subscripts denote the second derivatives.6 We see from (6) that the
curvature of the inverse demand function determines the balance between
the efficiency effect and the tax revenue effect. The following proposition
signs the nationally optimal tax rate under the destination principle.
Proposition 1 (a) Under the destination principle, the nationally optimal
tax rate is negative for all levels of trade costs if the inverse demand function
is convex (p′′ > 0). (b) If inverse demand is concave (p′′ < 0), the optimal
tax rate is positive.
Proof: See equation (6).
The optimal non-cooperative consumption tax has, in general, an ambigu-
ous sign. This is because of the opposing motives for taxation. The efficiency
effect encompasses several incentives: to (i) increase domestic consumption
through a subsidy, (ii) decrease the inefficiently high number of firms active
in both countries and (iii) increase the output of each firm in order to de-
crease the total fixed costs and to (iv) decrease the wasteful (in the presence
of trade costs) cross-shipping of goods keeping in mind that trade is beneficial
insofar as it increases competition.
When inverse demand is convex, a negative tax increases the size of do-
mestic firms while the overall effect on the amount produced by home firms
for domestic sale and on the amount produced by foreign firms for export is
indeterminate. However, the overall effect is to increase the amount sold on
the home market. A positive tax would result in prices rising by more than
the tax (p′1(∂Q
D
1 /∂t1) > 1) and so the optimal tax is negative as this reduces
the price in country 1 by more than amount of the subsidy and results in a
large increase in consumption.
In the case of concave inverse demand, a positive tax will increase the
size of domestic firms and, whatever the level of barriers to trade, have a
beneficial effect on the level of imports. A positive tax, when trade costs are
high, leads to a decrease in total imports from the foreign country and reduces
the wasteful trade costs. On the other hand, when trade barriers are low, the
6Note that Πyx = Πy1x2 = Πy2x1 and Πxy = Πx1y2 = Πx2y1 in the symmetric equilib-
rium but Πyx 6= Πxy unless x = y. See previous footnote.
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motive to increase competition predominates and a positive tax will increase
imports. Another effect of a positive tax is to decrease the numbers of firms
at home and abroad leading to lower average costs and lower prices net of
the tax (p′1(∂Q
D
1 /∂t1) < 1). Thus a positive tax has the desired effect on the
size of domestic firms, imports and the inefficiently high number of firms.
Furthermore, positive tax causes only a small drop in domestic consumption
and this effect is overridden by the incentive to gather revenue. In the special
case of linear demand, the efficiency effect and the tax revenue effect exactly
offset each other (p′1(∂Q
D
1 /∂t1) = 1) and so the optimal tax is zero.
Next we turn to the origin principle. In this case taxes are levied in the
country of production, i.e., the country i tax rate applies to all the country
i firms’ sales. So the tax is levied on each country i firm’s output for sale
in country i and on its exports to country j. Profits for a representative
firm in country 1 and country 2 under the origin principle, denoted by the
superscript O, are given by
Π1O = (p1 − c− t1)y1 + (p2 − c− s− t1)x1 − f,
Π2O = (p2 − c− t2)y2 + (p1 − c− s− t2)x2 − f,
respectively, where ti denotes the production tax imposed by country i. Ap-
pendix A.3 has the details of firm behavior. Welfare is now different as taxes
affect production so that
WOi = U(Qi)− pi(Qi)Qi + tini(yi + xi).
Maximizing welfare yields the nationally optimal origin principle tax rate of
country 1 (see Appendix A.3) which is given by
t̂O1 =
1
∂nO1
∂t1
(y1 + x1) + n1
(
∂xO1
∂t1
+
∂yO1
∂t1
)
p′1 ∂QO1∂t1Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I), −
−Q1︸︷︷︸
(II),+
 . (7)
As with the destination principle, there are two effects, the efficiency effect
(I) and the tax revenue effect (II). Again, the efficiency effect is negative and
captures the incentive to correct for the inefficiency of domestic consumption
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through the use of a subsidy. The main difference here is the effect of the tax
rate on the equilibrium outputs and the number of firms in each country as
can be seen from Table 3.
Table 3: Production tax effects
∂yO1
dt1
∂xO1
dt1
∂yO2
dt1
∂xO2
dt1
∂QO1
∂t1
∂QO2
∂t1
∂nO1
∂t1
∂nO2
∂t1
p′′ < 0 + − − + − + − +
p′′ = 0 + − − + − + − +
p′′ > 0 +/− − − + − + − +
Table 3 shows that the effects of a marginal tax change are qualitatively
similar for both concave and convex inverse demand: a marginal tax increase
in country 1 decreases profits in country 1 and leads to exit of firms in
that country. Firms in country 1 incur a tax on every unit they produce,
become less competitive with the firms in country 2 and so produce less
for export. On the other hand, each firm in country 2 now produces more
for export to take advantage of their lower total marginal costs per unit in
comparison to country 1 firms. With the rise in production for export there is
a corresponding reduction in production for domestic consumption. The only
difference between the comparative statics effects for the two types of inverse
demand is the ambiguity of the effect on the output of a representative firm
for domestic sale when inverse demand is convex.
The optimal non-cooperative tax under the origin principle (see Ap-
pendix A.3) is
t̂O = −np
′(y − x)(y + x)
Ω
[y(p′′y2 − 2p′x)Πyy − x2Π2xx] (8)
with
Ω = np′′[y2Πyy(y2 + 4x2) + x2Πxx(x2 + 4y2) +
3yx(y2Πyx + x
2Πxy) + p
′yx[(y + x)2 + 2yx]]
+2p′(2n+ 1)(y + x)(y2Πyy + x2Πxx),
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where, again, we have dropped the superscripts, and all variables are evalu-
ated at the symmetric equilibrium.
As with the optimal tax under the destination principle the balance be-
tween the competing incentives under the origin principle depends on the
curvature of inverse demand. The next proposition summarizes the results
for the nationally optimal origin principle tax rate.
Proposition 2 (a) Under the origin principle, the nationally optimal tax
rate is negative for all levels of trade costs if inverse demand is convex (p′′ >
0) (b) If inverse demand is concave (p′′ < 0), the optimal tax rate is positive
if s is sufficiently high and negative for sufficiently low (but nonzero) trade
costs.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The non-cooperative optimal tax rate under the origin principle is nega-
tive for convex demand. A subsidy on country 1’s production increases do-
mestic firms’ profits, while it decreases country 2 firms’ profits, causing exit of
foreign firms and entry of domestic firms. Each of the domestic firms present
in equilibrium will be producing more (∂yO1 /∂t1+∂x
O
1 /∂t1 < 0) while imports
will fall (see Table 3), leading to lower average costs and a large increase in
the suboptimal consumption of the good.
When demand is concave, the optimal tax rate depends on the level of
trade costs. For high trade costs the tax should be positive, as this will encour-
age some imports. The resulting decrease in the market power of domestic
firms will outweigh any negative effects from increased trade costs and im-
prove efficiency. Conversely, when trade costs are low the nationally optimal
policy is a subsidy. This is because a subsidy will encourage entry of domestic
firms, increase each domestic firm’s production (∂yO1 /∂t1+∂x
O
1 /∂t1 < 0) and
increase consumption.
The following proposition compares the nationally optimal taxes under
each of the tax principles.
Proposition 3 (a) The nationally optimal tax rate is higher under the des-
tination principle, if inverse demand is concave (p′′ < 0). (b) The optimal tax
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rate is higher under the origin principle, if inverse demand is convex (p′′ > 0)
and trade costs are sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
We cannot compare the tax rates for intermediate levels of trade costs if
inverse demand is convex. However, we are able to determine the minimal
trade cost levels under both tax principles which lead to zero exports. Let s¯D
and s¯O denote this level for the non-cooperative optimal destination and ori-
gin principle tax rates, respectively. We find a clear relationship irrespective
of the curvature of the inverse demand function.
Proposition 4 The nationally optimal tax rate under the destination prin-
ciple leads to no trade for a lower level of trade costs than the nationally
optimal tax rate under the origin principle, i.e., s¯D < s¯O.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
Since the tax rate under the origin principle is positive for high trade
costs but negative under the destination principle, there is a range of trade
costs such that the origin principle will still allow for trade whereas the
destination principle will imply no trade. This finding will also be important
for the welfare analysis of both tax principles to which we turn now.
4 Economic integration and the choice of the
tax principle
In this section the welfare levels that each country obtains when they set taxes
non-cooperatively are compared. The criterion against which we compare the
two tax principles is the optimal tax that would result from maximizing the
combined welfare of the two countries. Under our assumption of identical
countries we have a symmetric tax equilibrium, which means the tax levied
on all units produced will be the same. This implies that maximization of
aggregate welfare under the destination regime is equivalent to maximization
under the origin regime. Here we use the destination principle since it is
13
simpler. World welfare is measured as the sum of consumer surplus and tax
revenue in both countries:
W˜ = U(Q1)− p1(Q1)Q1 + U(Q2)− p2(Q2)Q2 + t1Q1 + t2Q2.
Maximizing world welfare with respect to the tax rate chosen by both coun-
tries obtains the coordinated optimal tax rate (see Appendix A.5)
t˜ =
1
dQD1 /dt1 + dQ
D
2 /dt1
p′1dQD1dt1 Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I),−
+ p′2
dQD2
dt1
Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II),+/−
−Q1︸︷︷︸
(III),+
 (9)
= −np
′′(y2 + x2)
2
.
The optimal tax rate takes into account the effect on both countries’ con-
sumer surplus [terms (I) and (II)] and weighs this against the positive tax
revenue effect (III). This tax is negative when inverse demand is convex,
while for concave inverse demand it is positive.
In order to gain some intuition of the spillover effects of the optimal non-
cooperative taxes levied by country 1 we evaluate their effect on country 2
welfare.7 When taxes are levied under the destination regime, the effect on
country 2’s welfare is given by
∂WD2
∂t1
= −p′2
∂QD2
∂t1
Q2 + t2
∂QD2
∂t1
Q2. (10)
This expression also gives the marginal effect of a change in country 1’s tax
rate on world welfare since country 1 chooses its nationally optimal tax rate
so that ∂WD1 /∂t1 = 0. From the assumption of quasiconcavity of the welfare
function it follows that if ∂WD2 /∂t1 > 0 (the spillover is positive) the non-
cooperative destination principle tax rate is less than the coordinated tax
rate, while if ∂WD2 /∂t1 < 0 (the spillover is negative) the non-cooperative
tax rate is greater than the coordinated tax rate.
7A similar approach is used by Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2004).
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Additionally, we may also consider the effect on marginal world welfare
if both countries agree on the destination principle. We find that
dW˜
dt1
(t1 = t2 = t̂
D) = − np
′′yx(y + x)
y(Πyx +Πxy) + xΠxx
. (11)
This expression is negative for concave inverse demand and positive for con-
vex inverse demand.
We are now ready to discuss the the difference between the destination
principle tax and the optimal tax. Consider equation (10). The first term
represents the effect of a small tax rise in country 1 on country 2 consumer
surplus, while the second term is the direct effect on the tax take of country
2. For concave demand both terms are negative (see Table 2), and so the
destination principle tax is too high as it fails to take into account the nega-
tive spillovers. On the other hand, for convex inverse demand, the first term
is positive and the second is negative. From the positive sign of (11) we see
that the negative effect on the tax revenue of country 2 is outweighed by the
positive effect on consumer surplus. The positive net spillovers imply that the
non-cooperative destination tax will be too low. For the special case of linear
demand, the nationally optimal destination principle tax rate is the same as
the coordinated tax rate, as for linear demand a small change in the tax rate
in country 1 has no effect on the price in country 2 for any level of trade costs
(see Table 2). Then, from equation (10), the spillover effects of the tax are
zero. Note that for nonlinear demand and non-prohibitive trade costs (i.e.,
x > 0) equation (11) is nonzero (assuming there is some production), so the
nationally optimal destination regime tax is not Pareto optimal for any level
of trade costs at which trade takes place.
Next we consider non-cooperative taxation under the origin principle. The
effect on welfare in country 2 is given by:
∂WO2
∂t1
= −p′2
∂QO2
∂t1
Q2 + t2
(
∂nO2
∂t1
(y2 + x2) + n2
(
∂yO2
∂t1
+
∂xO2
∂t1
))
(12)
Again, evaluating (12) at t2 = t̂
O, positive values imply that the non-
cooperative origin principle tax rate is too low, while negative values imply
that it is too high. When we substitute the comparative statics results (see
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Appendix A.5) and the nationally optimal origin regime tax rate (8) into
equation (12) we find that ∂W˜/∂t1|t1=t2=btO > 0 for concave demand, while
for convex demand the sign depends on the level of trade costs. For convex
demand and sufficiently high or low trade costs we have ∂W˜/∂t1|t1=t2=btO < 0,
while this expression may be positive for intermediate levels of trade costs.
The first term of (12) is the spillover effect on country 2’s consumer
surplus, which is positive (see Table 3). This positive effect is a result of a
tax improving efficiency of consumption. The latter term takes the sign of
the tax and represents the spillover effect on the country 2 tax base. When
the country 2 tax is positive, a small rise in country 1’s tax increases overall
production in country 2 and leads to an increase in country 2’s tax revenue.
In this case a tax levied by country 1 will have positive spillovers, which
are ignored when setting their tax, resulting in a non-cooperative optimal
origin regime tax that is too low. However, with convex or linear inverse
demand, country 2’s nationally optimal tax is negative and so they will have
to increase their subsidy payments as a result of country 1’s tax increase. This
negative effect on country 2’s welfare is ignored when country 1 sets their tax.
For convex demand and sufficiently low or high trade costs or for concave
demand, this negative spillover outweighs any positive effects on efficiency
and thus the non-cooperative origin tax rate is too high. For intermediate
values of s and convex demand, it may be the case that the two spillovers
exactly cancel each other out and the nationally optimal origin regime tax
matches the Pareto efficient tax.
While these results do not indicate any general welfare ranking of tax
principles which depends on the degree of integration, we are able to say
more if we consider the two special cases of no trade and zero trade costs. We
start with the limiting case of trade costs that are so large that the optimal
tax rates eliminate all trade. Let s˜ denote this level for the coordinated tax
rate. Substituting x = 0 into (6), (9) and (8) we find that
s˜ = s¯D ⇒ t̂D|s=es = t˜|s=es = −np′′y2
2
, t̂O|s=s¯O = − np
′p′′y2
n(Πyy + 2p′) + 2p′
. (13)
Hence, the destination principle tax equilibrium maximizes aggregate welfare.
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This is because with prohibitive trade costs a small change in the tax levied
in country 1 under the destination principle has no effect on country 2’s
consumption [see (10)] and so there are no spillovers. Therefore the optimal
non-cooperative tax under the destination principle is the same as the Pareto
efficient tax rate. These tax rates are the same as in the autarky case [see
equation (4)].
Under the origin principle, there are still spillovers present. When inverse
demand is concave the spillovers are positive and so the tax is too low, while
the spillovers are negative when inverse demand is convex and so the tax is
too high. When inverse demand is linear (p′′ = 0) all the optimal tax rates are
zero, s˜ = s¯D = s¯O, and non-cooperative taxation under both tax principles
is Pareto efficient at prohibitive levels of trade costs.
Furthermore, Proposition 4 has shown that the destination principle im-
plies a lower minimal level of trade costs for which exports become zero
whereas the origin principle will still support trade. Expression (13) demon-
strates that s˜ = s¯D, and hence we find that only the destination principle
manages trade optimally for high trade costs unless inverse demand is linear.
Corollary 1 The destination principle guarantees that countries do not
trade when it is globally welfare-maximizing not to trade. If inverse demand is
nonlinear, the origin principle implies socially excessive trade for high trade
cost levels, i.e., if s ∈ [s˜, s¯O].
Proof: Corollary 1 is a direct result of Proposition 4 and expression (13).
The other limiting case is that of zero trade costs. In contrast to the
model with a fixed number of firms the division of output between countries is
indeterminate when trade costs are truly zero because markets have become
completely integrated.8 However, we may instead consider trade costs as
they become infinitesimally small. As this takes place the market share of
exporters approaches that of the domestic producers, i.e., x approaches y.
Substituting x = y into (6), (9) and (8) we get
t̂D|s=0 = −2np
′′y2(2p′′y + 3p′)
3p′′y + 4p′
, t̂O|s=0 = 0, t˜|s=0 = −np′′y2. (14)
8For s = 0, the Jacobian determinant of the system of first order conditions is zero.
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So for nonlinear demand, both the optimal non-cooperative destination and
origin regime taxes deviate from the cooperative tax when trade costs are
zero. When inverse demand is concave the non-cooperative consumption tax
is too large as the negative spillover effects are still present in the absence of
trade costs [see equation (11)]. Conversely, when inverse demand is convex,
the positive net spillovers are not taken into account resulting in a subsidy
that is too small. In contrast, the non-cooperative production tax is too small.
The origin principle tax rate is zero because as trade costs tend to zero, any
marginal tax change would lead to infinite changes in quantities demanded,
and infinite changes in the number of firms in each country.
Note that for the special case of linear demand and zero trade costs,
all taxes are zero and so both the destination and origin principles lead to
Pareto efficient outcomes. As noted earlier, this holds for all levels of trade
costs under the destination principle as with linear demand a marginal change
in country 1’s tax rate has no effect on consumption in country 2. This is
not the case under the origin principle. It turns out that although each of
the spillovers are nonzero, when demand is linear and trade costs are zero
they cancel each other out and therefore the origin principle tax equilibrium
is Pareto efficient.
Based on these findings, we are now ready to present the main results of
the paper.
Proposition 5 (a) At prohibitively high levels of trade costs, the non-
cooperative tax equilibrium under the destination principle is Pareto efficient.
In the neighbourhood of s˜, it weakly dominates the non-cooperative equilib-
rium under the origin principle. (b) When inverse demand is linear, the
non-cooperative tax equilibrium under the destination principle is Pareto ef-
ficient for all levels of trade costs. It weakly dominates the non-cooperative
equilibrium under the origin principle for all levels of trade costs.
Proof: (a) See (13). (b) Substitute p′′ = 0 into (6) and (9). Both the nationally
optimal destination regime tax and the coordinated tax are zero, while the
nationally optimal tax under the origin regime may not be [see (8)].
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These results lend some support to the use of the destination principle
when trade costs are near prohibitive or demand is linear. Proposition 5,
however, tells us nothing about the magnitude of the destination principle
equilibrium level of welfare compared to the origin principle equilibrium or
whether there is some level of trade costs at which the origin principle dom-
inates.
5 Concluding remarks
We have examined the role of trade costs in the choice between tax regimes in
a reciprocal dumping model with free entry and non-cooperative tax setting.
In this model, the nationally optimal tax is chosen to increase the domes-
tic underconsumption of the traded good; to decrease the inefficiently high
number of firms each incurring a fixed cost of setup and producing too little;
and to alleviate the wasteful trade costs that arise from cross-shipping iden-
tical goods. In this framework we found support for the destination principle
when trade costs are prohibitive. This replicates the result of the duopoly
model investigated by Haufler et al. (2005). In their model with a fixed num-
ber of firms, however, they found that as trade costs tended toward zero the
origin principle approached the coordinated tax rate and dominated the tax
equilibrium under the destination principle. In the long run (i.e., with free
entry) this is no longer the case. In general neither of the non-cooperative
tax equilibriums is Pareto efficient when trade costs are zero.
We do, however, obtain a strong result in favor of the destination principle
when demand is linear, as in this special case the non-cooperative tax under
this principle coincides with the Pareto efficient level for all levels of trade
costs. Under the origin regime, however, the nationally optimal tax deviates
from the Pareto efficient level for all intermediate levels of trade costs. Hence,
endogenous market structures do not support the origin principle for low
levels of trade costs as models with a fixed market structure do.
Overall, it seems unclear which tax principle is favorable. Even if the des-
tination principle may have its merits with free entry and exit, it creates a
high adminstrative burden when trade volumes are substantial. Furthermore,
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the results depend crucially on the type of competition, and this type will
not be the same across the board of all markets. Typically, tax principles
apply to all commodities and do not distinguish according to the type of the
market environment under which these commodities are produced. Unless
the type of competition is the same for all commodities produced in all coun-
tries, individual countries will balance the pros and cons of tax principles
across all markets differently. This may explain disagreement among govern-
ments. Hashimzade et al. (2006) show in a duopoly model why countries may
disagree on tax principles if they are asymmetric in terms of size or costs.
Another source of disagreement could be the dominant type of competition
which may differ across countries.
Appendix
A.1 Autarky
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions, we obtain p′ p′ + p′′y 0−p′y p′y 0
−n 1 −y
 dydQ
dn
 =
 1y
0
 dt. (A.1)
Solving (A.1) yields
dy
dt
= − p
′′y
p′(2p′ + p′′y)
,
dQ
dt
=
2
2p′ + p′′y
,
dn
dt
=
2p′ + np′′y
p′y(2p′ + p′′y)
, (A.2)
which proves the tax effects as given by Table 1. Furthermore, substituting
dQ/dt and dn/dt into (3) and setting dW/dt = 0 leads to the optimal autarky
tax (4).
A.2 Destination principle
The first order condition w.r.t. the tax is given by
∂WD1
∂t1
= −p′1
∂QD1
∂t1
+Q1 + t1
∂QD1
∂t1
= 0. (A.3)
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Solving for t1 leads to (5). Firm behavior is determined by
ΠDyi = (pi − c− ti) + p′iyi = 0, (A.4)
ΠDxi = (pj − c− s− tj) + p′jxi = 0.
Total differentiation yields
A×

dy1
dx1
dy2
dx2
dQ1
dQ2
dn1
dn2

=

dt1
dt2
dt2
dt1
y1dt1 + x1dt2
x2dt1 + y2dt2
0
0

(A.5)
where
A =

p′1 0 0 0 p
′
1 + p
′′
1y1 0 0 0
0 p′2 0 0 0 p
′
2 + p
′′
2x1 0 0
0 0 p′2 0 0 p
′
2 + p
′′
2y2 0 0
0 0 0 p′1 p
′
1 + p
′′
1x2 0 0 0
−p′1y1 −p′2x1 0 0 p′1y1 p′2x1 0 0
0 0 −p′2y2 −p′1x2 p′1x2 p′2y2 0 0
−n1 0 0 −n2 1 0 −y1 −x2
0 −n1 −n2 0 0 1 −x1 −y2

.
To find the effect of a change in country 1’s tax rate, we set dt2 = 0, use
symmetry to simplify and solve to obtain the equilibrium responses w.r.t. a
change in the destination principle tax:
∂yD1
∂t1
= −p
′′[y(y + x)Πyy + x2(p′′y − Πxx)]
p′(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
∂xD1
∂t1
= − 2p
′′yxΠxy
p′(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
∂yD2
∂t1
= − 2p
′′yxΠyx
p′(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
∂xD2
∂t1
=
p′′[y(y − x)Πyy − x2(Πyx +Πxy)]
p′(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
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∂QD1
∂t1
=
2[p′′yx+ [yΠyy + xΠxx]
(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
∂QD2
∂t1
=
2p′′yx
(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
,
∂nD1
∂t1
=
2y[np′′x(yΠyy − xΠxx) + p′(y + x)Πyy]
p′(y − x)(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)) ,
∂nD2
∂t1
= − 2x[np
′′y(xΠxx − yΠyy) + p′(y + x)Πxx]
p′(y − x)(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)) .
For convenience we have dropped unnecessary subscripts. Inserting these
results into (5) gives (6). To sign the terms (see Table 2), first observe that
y − x = −s/p′ ≥ 0 due to (A.4). Then, all of the comparative static effects
but ∂yD1 /∂t1, ∂x
D
2 /∂t1 and ∂n
D
1 /∂t1 can easily be signed by using strategic
substitutability. To sign ∂yD1 /∂t1, we subtract ∂x
D
1 /∂t1 from ∂y
D
1 /∂t1:
∂yD1
∂t1
− ∂x
D
1
∂t1
=
(y + x)(y − x)p′′
p′yΠyy + xΠxx
.
When inverse demand is concave, this expression is positive, implying
∂yD1 /∂t1 > ∂x
D
1 /∂t1. For concave inverse demand ∂x
D
1 /∂t1 is positive and
so ∂yD1 /∂t1 is positive. If inverse demand is convex, the above expression and
the term ∂xD1 /∂t1 take a negative sign and so ∂y
D
1 /∂t1 is negative. We can
sign ∂xD2 /∂t1 and ∂n
D
1 /∂t1 easily when inverse demand is concave. However,
for convex inverse demand, the signs of ∂xD2 /∂t1 and ∂n
D
1 /∂t1 depend on the
level of trade costs. High (low) trade costs imply ∂xD2 /∂t1 is positive (neg-
ative). ∂nD1 /∂t1 is negative for sufficiently high or low trade costs, while it
may be positive for intermediate values of s.
A.3 Origin principle
The first order condition w.r.t. the tax is given by
∂WO1
∂t1
= −p′1
∂QO1
∂t1
+n1(y1+x1)+t1
(
∂nO1
∂t1
(y1 + x1) + n1
(
∂yO1
∂t1
+
∂xO1
∂t1
))
= 0.
(A.6)
Solving for t1 leads to (7). Firm behavior is determined by
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ΠOyi = (pi − c− ti) + p′iyi = 0, (A.7)
ΠOxi = (pj − c− s− ti) + p′jxi = 0.
Total differentiation yields
A×

dy1
dx1
dy2
dx2
dQ1
dQ2
dn1
dn2

=

dt1
dt1
dt2
dt2
(y1 + x1)dt1
(y2 + x2)dt2
0
0

(A.8)
where the matrix A is the same as in (A.5). As before, we set dt2 = 0, use
symmetry to simplify and solve to obtain the equilibrium responses w.r.t. a
change in the origin principle tax:
∂yO1
∂t1
= −p
′′[y2(y + 2x)Πyy + x3Πxx] + 2p′x(yΠyy + xΠxx)
p′(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂xO1
∂t1
=
p′′[y3Πyy + x2(2y + x)Πxx] + 2p′y(yΠyy + xΠxx)
p′(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂yO2
∂t1
=
2x(y + x)ΠyxΠxx
p′(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂xO2
∂t1
= − 2y(y + x)ΠyyΠxy
p′(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂QO1
∂t1
=
2y(y + x)Πyy
(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂QO2
∂t1
= − 2x(y + x)Πxx
(y − x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂nO1
∂t1
=
ny2Πyy[y(Πyx +Πxy) + 2x(2Πyx +Πxy)] + nx
2Πxx[x(Πyx +Πxy) + 2y(Πyx + 2Πxy)]
p′(y − x)2(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) +
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2p′(y + x)(y2Πyy + x2Πxx)
p′(y − x)2(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) ,
∂nO2
∂t1
=
−ny
2Πyy[y(Πyx +Πxy) + 6xΠxy] + nx
2Πxx[x(Πyx +Πxy) + 6yΠyx]
p′(y − x)2(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) −
− 2p
′yx(y + x)(Πyy +Πxx)
p′(y − x)2(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy) .
Once again, we have dropped unnecessary subscripts. The first order condi-
tions A.7 imply that y ≥ x. Using symmetry and strategic substitutability,
it is then straightforward to sign all of the comparative statics effects, except
∂yO1 /∂t1 and ∂x
O
1 /∂t1. Subtracting ∂y
O
2 /∂t1 from ∂x
O
1 /∂t1 leads to
∂xO1
∂t1
− ∂y
O
2
∂t1
=
(y + x)2(y − x)p′′2 + 4p′yΠyx + 4p′2x
p′(yΠyy + xΠxx)(Πyx +Πxy)
.
This expression is negative, implying ∂xO1 /∂t1 < ∂y
O
2 /∂t1. Since ∂y
O
2 /∂t1 < 0,
it follows that ∂xO1 /∂t1 < 0. The sign of ∂y
O
1 /∂t1 is positive for concave
inverse demand. When inverse demand is convex, its sign depends on the
level of trade costs – for high trade costs (x ≈ 0) it is negative and for low
trade cost (x ≈ y) it is positive.
For the proof of part (a) of Proposition 2, we first sign the denominator
of (7) which can be written as
∂nO1
∂t1
(y1 + x1) + n1
(
∂xO1
∂t1
+
∂yO1
∂t1
)
=
∂QO1
∂t1
+
∂(n1x1 − n2x2)O
∂t1
.
From Table 3, the first term on the RHS is negative. The second term can
be calculated by using the comparative statics results:
∂(n1x1 − n2x2)O
∂t1
=
n[(y2 + 3x2)Πyx + (3y
2 + x2)Πxy] + 2p
′x(y + x)
p′(y − x)2(Πyx +Πxy)
which is negative due to strategic substitutability. Thus the denominator is
negative. For the numerator we find that
p′1
∂QO1
∂t1
Q1 − n1(y1 + x1) = −n(y + x)[y(p
′′y2 − 2p′x)Πyy − x2Π2xx]
(y − x)(Πyx +Πxy)(yΠyy + xΠxx) .
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Due to strategic substitutability, the numerator of (7) is positive if inverse
demand is convex, i.e., p′′ > 0. Next, we sign the numerator for different
levels of trade costs. For sufficiently high trade costs (x ≈ 0) we obtain
p′1
∂QO1
∂t1
Q1 − n1(y1 + x1) ≈ −np
′′y2
Πyx
which is negative for p′′ < 0. Thus, for sufficiently high trade costs, the tax
is positive. For sufficiently small trade costs, x ≈ y and consequently
p′1
∂QO1
∂t1
Q1 − n1(y1 + x1) ≈ 8np
′y3Πyy
(y − x)(Πyx +Πxy)(yΠyy + xΠxx)
which is positive which proves that the tax is negative for sufficiently low
trade costs and which completes the proof of part (b) of Proposition 2.
A.4 Comparison of tax principles
We evaluate the (11) at the equilibrium tax rate under the origin principle.
Due to quasiconcavity, it follows that t̂D > (<)t̂O when ∂WD1 /∂t1|t1=btO >
( < )0. For the proof of part (a) of Proposition 3, we calculate ∂WD1 /∂t1|t1=btO
using the comparative statics results of Appendix A.2 and (8) in (11) which
results in ∂WD1 /∂t1(t1 = t2 = t̂
O) > 0, implying that t̂D > t̂O. For the proof
of part (b) of Proposition 3, we use x = 0 to obtain
∂WD1
∂t1
(t1 = t2 = t̂
O) =
n2p′′y2(4p′ + p′′y)
(2p′ + p′′y)[n(4p′ + p′′y) + 2p′]
which is negative for p′′ > 0. Hence, t̂D < t̂O for sufficiently high trade costs
and convex inverse demand. When trade costs are small, using x = y yields
∂WD1
∂t1
(t1 = t2 = t̂
O) =
np′′y2(3p′ + 2p′′y)
(2p′ + p′′y)(p′ + p′′y)
which is also negative for p′′ > 0, implying that t̂D < t̂O also for sufficiently
small trade costs and convex inverse demand. This completes the proof of
part (b) of Proposition 3.
As for the proof of Proposition 4, it is first useful to determine the effect
of a tax rise on total exports. From the comparative statics results of both
25
Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3 we obtain
∂(n1x1 + n2x2)
∂t1
=
np′′(y − x)(y2 + x2) + 2p′x(y + x)
p′(y + x)(yΠyy + xΠxx)
.
This expression is negative if inverse demand is concave, implying that ag-
gregate exports are monotonously falling in t1 under both tax principles. For
convex demand and high trade costs (x ≈ 0), this expression is positive such
that aggregate exports will monotonously rise with t1 for that case. Propo-
sition 3 shows that t̂O < t̂D for all levels of trade costs if inverse demand is
concave. Since aggregate exports are monotonously falling in t1 in this case,
we conclude that ŝD < ŝO. Proposition 3 also shows that 0 > t̂O > t̂D for
high levels of trade costs if inverse demand is convex. Since aggregate exports
are monotonously rising in t1 in that case, we conclude that ŝ
D < ŝO. Hence,
ŝD < ŝO in all conceivable cases which completes the proof of Proposition 4.
A.5 Global welfare maximization
Maximizing global welfare warrants
∂W˜
∂t1
= −p′1
∂QD1
∂t1
Q1 +Q1 + t1
∂QD1
∂t1
− p′2
∂QD2
∂t1
+ t2
∂QD2
∂t1
= 0.
Rearranging and using symmetry (t1 = t2) yields (9).
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